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We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, 
projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered 
Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of 
all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with 
well-known "chaos theorems," which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any 
meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional. 
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1 Introduction 
McKelvey's celebrated theorems [?] , [?] on the genericity of global cycles in maj ority 
voting are fu ndamental to our understanding of the potential outcomes of a social decision 
process. These results as sert that if the set of social alternatives is a multidimensional 
Euclidean space, then under mild conditions on the profile of voters' preferences, there is
a finite chain of alternatives starting at any given x and ending in any other y such that
each alternative in the chain is preferred by a maj ority of voters to its predecessor. These 
results are often interpreted to show that in multidimensional policy spaces maj ority 
voting is chaotic or unstable since no alternative appears to dominate the others. 
The general conclusions drawn fr om this interpretation of McKelvey's Chaos The­
orems1 have led many people to believe that it is impossible to predict the nature of 
social decision- making without a detailed specification of social institutions and rules. 
For instance, [?] writes, "If, however, there are a variety of dimensions-some individuals 
are liberal on some issues and conservative on others- then the median voter is not well 
defined, and there may be no equilibrium to the political process ." According to [?] ,  
"By the mid- to late 1970s, theorists had clearly demonstrated that searching for a uni­
versally applicable theory of political equilibrium is a fu tile exercise. Further, maj ority 
voting would generically lead to cycles, unless the voting agenda was restricted . . . .  The 
outlook of many researchers at the time was thus quite pessimistic: any positive theory 
of political choice - whether it was based on maj ority voting or not - seemingly had to 
rely on unattractive or arbitrary assumptions." 
*This paper was written in fond memory of our dear friend and colleague Jeffrey Scot Banks. Financial
support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Salvador Barbera for 
helpful conversations that helped spark some of the ideas behind the model we develop here, and David 
Austen-Smith for detailed comments on an earlier draft. 
1 A version of the Chaos Theorem for the finite unstructured setting has been proved by [?]. We refer 
the reader to chapter 6 in [?] for an illuminating presentation of chaos results in the spatial model. 
These beliefs have resulted in a growing bod y  of literature that d erives social equilibria 
cond itional on explicit specifications of the institutional structure. Without d enying 
the importance of that d irection of investigation, one is left with the impression that 
except in exceptional cases, very little can be said about social choice outcomes that is 
institution-free. This is problematic if the equilibrium outcomes are highly sensitive to 
the fine d etails of the institutional process. For instance, if the "institution" resembles 
a bargaining game, then the equilibrium outcome will typically d epend on the specific 
bargaining protocol. Therefore, it appears as if the unpred ictability associated with the 
chaos theorems has been replaced by a pred ictability that may suffer from a lack of 
robustness. 
The approach ad opted in this paper, following another of [?] infl uential papers, is to 
explore whether there are some pred ictions about majoritarian social choice outcomes 
that are "relatively" institution- free. More precisely, is it possible to bound the set of 
"stable social outcomes" in the sense that all social equilibria must lie within these bound s  
und er a wid e variety of d ifferent institutional arrangements? In this paper, we focus on 
two such sets: the Uncovered Set of [?] and the Banks Set [?]. 
The two sets are arguably the most appropriate ones to bound the possible social out­
comes. Reference [?] d emonstrated 2 that in any multid imensional setting where voters
have quasi- concave preferences (the so- called spatial setting) , the Uncovered Set contains 
the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior und er three d ifferent insti­
tutional frameworks : a two- cand id ate competition in a large electorate3 , cooperative 
behavior in small committees, and sophisticated behavior in a legislative environment. 
Hence, in a strong sense the Uncovered Set is a useful generalization of the notion of a 
Cond orcet winner. The Banks Set is less general than the Uncovered Set in that it only 
applies to a specific institution. Nevertheless, that institution, voting by amend ment 
agend as (also known as voting by successive elimination) , is a very important one which 
is parad igmatic for most committee voting rules and is the proced ure central to Roberts 
Parliamentary Rules of Ord er. It is oft en asserted that a chairman (or sub- committee) 
can manipulate the agend a so as to ensure the choice of an alternative which is in his 
(or its) interest . However, Miller and McKelvey showed that the set of sophisticated 
equilibrium outcomes correspond ing to voting by successive elimination must lie in the 
Uncovered Set; and [?] provid ed a full characterization of this set of outcomes, which is 
the Banks Set. Thus, the Banks Set puts some bound s  on the monopoly power of an 
agend a setter in the context of amend ment agend as.4 
The uncovered and Banks Sets have been investigated extensively in the case where 
the set of alternatives is finite and voters have no a priori structure to their prefe rences, 
and so some properties of these sets are now well- known.5 However, the explicit com­
putation of these sets is not easy, particularly when the feasible set of alternatives is 
2Reference [?] had already shown that under a variety of institutional settings, game theoretic be-
havior by participants leads to outcomes in the Uncovered Set when the set of alternatives is finite. 
30n this aspect, see also [?]. 
4Reference [?] , [?] argue that the interest for studying the Banks Set goes beyond this. 
5See [?] for a detailed description of this area of research. 
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some subset of multi-d imensional Euclid ean space and one might expect some natural 
structure to v oters' preferences. The only real analysis that has mad e any progress on 
that issue is in the case of purely d istributiv e  politics, where [?] and [?] hav e shown that 
the Uncov ered Set is the entire set of alternativ es;6 and recent papers by [?] and [?] who 
show that specific equilibrium notions of agend a formation can lead to some pointed 
pred ictions in some circumstances. 
This paper furthers our und erstand ing of the structure of the behav ior of majority rule 
in spatial settings in two ways. The first is that we id entify a broad class of social choice 
problems that includ es many situations that hav e  been analyzed separately in the litera­
ture. The common feature of these problems is that an alternativ e is a feasible allocation 
of a giv en bud get across finitely many uses or projects. These projects could correspond 
to ind iv id uals if we mod el priv ate transfers in a d istributiv e politics env ironment, or to 
d istricts or regions or d ifferent types of public expend itures in the context of pork barrel 
politics and financing of local public good s ( [?] , [?] ) .  Other bud get allocation problems 
cov ered by our framework includ e the mixed setting where some priv ate projects compete 
with a global public project as in [?] . Our key assumption is that v oters' preferences are 
linear; that is , ind ifference contour sets are parallel hyperplanes . While a special case 
of the spatial mod el, this is a rich setting that to the best of our knowled ge has nev er 
been inv estigated in any generality before. Our second contribution is to prov id e some 
(partial) characterizations of the uncov ered , Banks, and Top Cycle sets in this setting, 
in the context of some important special cases. In particular, we examine in some d etail 
the case where each v oter v iews each project as either being good or bad. 
In the next section, we introd uce and illustrate the linear setting and the main con­
cepts which are used in this paper. In sect. 3, we introd uce the main majoritarian sets 
which are examined in this paper. Then, in sects. 4- 7, we focus on the special case where 
there are three projects and three v oters. In sect . 4, we present the simple geometry of 
the majority relation in the linear setting. We show that the necessary and sufficient 
cond ition for the existence of a Cond orcet winner in this setting is less stringent than 
the well- known cond ition of [?] . We also offer a d irect simple proof of McKelv ey's chaos 
theorem on the Top Cycle. Then, we calculate explicitly the Uncov ered Set for many 
important linear settings. We also calculate or d escribe with some accuracy the Banks 
Set to show how much it d iffers from the Uncov ered Set . We conclud e in sect . 8 with a 
d iscussion of the general case. 
2 A Model of Budget Allocation where Voters have 
Linear Preferences 
Alternatives 
6See also [?], [?], [?], [?], [?], [?], [?] , [?] . 
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The set of alternatives X consists of the set of feasible allocations of a given bud get, 
d enoted by M, among K d istinct possible uses. The uses may be thought of , d epend ing 
upon the context , as being d istricts, regions, ind ivid uals, public projects or other criteria. 
Generic elements of X are d enoted x, y, and z, and are K-d imensional vectors. 
If money is assumed to be perfectly d ivisible , then the set X is infinite. In this case, 
X is the simplex 
{x E JR! : t xk = M} . 
k=l 
When M = 1 ,  the set of social alternatives could be alternatively interpreted as the set 
of lotteries over an unstructured finite set of choices. 
If, instead , money can only be d ivid ed into d iscrete units, with say 1 being the smallest 
unit of money, then the set X is finite. It is then d efined as7 
{x E {O, 1 ,  . . .  , M} K : t xk = M} . 
k=l 
We shall alternate between the use of these two settings. While the infinitely d ivisible 
setting provid es some technical ad vantages, we stick with the finite world in situations 
where we analyze the Banks Set , as an uncontroversial d efinition for the Banks Set has 
not been given for the case where X is infinite. We shall d iscuss the limit as the units 
become small (M becomes large) , and this provid es some pred ictions for the infinite case.
This also gives us some feel for the importance of d ivisibilities, as we shall see that 
at least in some cases the Banks Set changes as the units become relatively small, and 
the limit may have d ifferent features fr om situations with substantial ind ivisibilities. 
We assume that M � 4 in the ind ivisible setting, as the case where M :::; 3 is an
easily analyzed special case where the geometry of the problem d egenerates. 
Voters and Preferences 
The committee or society of voters is d escribed by the finite set N = { 1, . . .  , N} . 
Voter i has preferences over the set of alternatives represented as follows. There exists 
a vector ui E JRK such that the utility to i of an alternative x is simply ui · x. Thus, i
prefers an alternative x to an al ternative y if and only if 
Ui • X > Ui · y. 
Thus, uf d enotes i 's marginal valuation for project k. So, preferences are completely 
d escribed by the matrix u - (u1 , .... , UN) E JR
NK.
7We presume that the entire budget is allocated. This is in line with voters viewing at least one of
the projects as not being objectionable. 
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The linearity of ind ifference is obviously special; but, as we now illustrate, it is general 
enough to cover a large family of interesting problems. 
Example 1 Private Projects: Divid e  the Dollar 
This correspond s  to the case where K = N and the matrix u is equivalent to 
U =
1 0 0 
0 1 
0 1 
D
The conventional interpretation of this problem is that an alternative is a d ivision 
of the amount M among the N voters, who are assumed to d erive utility exclusively 
from the amount they receive, the larger the better. A second interpretation views the 
K d imensions as K public projects in competition and assuming that each voter cares 
exclusively about the amount allocated to a specific project, justifying the terminology 
"private projects" even if the projects have the features of public projects. 
Example 2 Good s  and Bad s D
Consid er a world where each d imension is viewed by a voter as either a "good " or 
a "bad" project. Good s  are equivalent in the voter's view, as are bad s. To normalize 
things, good s  have a marginal value of 1 and bad s  have a marginal value of 0. So each 
ui is a vector of O's and- l 's. 
A special case of this is the d ivid e the d ollar setting d escribed in Example ?? , where 
each player has a d ifferent d imension that is a good , and only one d imension, and where 
the number of d imensions is the number of voters K = N. A nother special case is 
the private and public good example (Example ?? ,  below) , in the case where b = 1 .  
More generally, the good s and bad s  mod el is one where K might d iffer from N, several 
voters might view any particular d imension as good , and players might consid er several 
d imensions to be "good s." 
Example 3 Private Projects versus a Public Project D
This example, inspired by [?] , is a setting mixing the d ivid e the d ollar setting (Exam­
ple ??) w ith an extra public project that is a pure public good . Here voters are bargaining 
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between allocating resources to a common public good , and payments d irectly to the vot­
ers themselves. In particular, K = N + 1 and
U= 
1 0 0 b 
0 1 0 b 
0 0 1 b 
where b is a positive parameter d escribing the common willingness to pay of each voter 
for the public project . 
Example 4 Choice Between Public Projects D
Consid er a society allocating resources to any of a list of projects, which may have
private and / or public components. In this case, there are no specific restrictions on the
matrix u. The K d imensions are interpreted as K d ifferent potentially projects that are 
in competition for fund ing. The allocation xk d efines the scale of operation of project
k (variations in costs can be incorporated into the marginal utilities) . Certainly, voter 
i would like to see al l the bud get al located to his or her "favorite projects" (projects k 
such that uf ?:: uf' for all k') . However, unlike the good s  and the bad s  mod el, an agent 
is not systematically ind ifferent between projects that are id entical in their allocation to 
the agent's most preferred projects. 
When K = N, and the K d imensions are interpreted as d istricts or states in a 
fed eration or regions in a country, this mod el d escribes pork barrel politics with some 
form of externalities across projects. Suppose that region i d erives a benefit equal to
Xi from project i operated at the scale xi, but also d erives some benefits from projects
implemented in other regions. The benefits resulting from these other projects are less 
important, the more "d istant" is the region (where d istance might or might not be a 
physical measure) . Precisely, uf = 1 - adik· Knowled ge of the intensity a of the exter­
nality and the pattern d escribing the geographical network, is essential for und erstand ing 
the voting behavior. 8 
Example 5 Criteria D
When bargaining over the split of a bud get , it is often the case that the d iscussion 
takes place on various criteria that might be used to allocate the bud get instead of 
d irectly in terms of the allocation itself. 9 For instance, consid er a university d ecid ing on 
how to allocate a bud get among a set of d epartments. The d ecision might be based on 
a whole set of criteria includ ing quality of research and teaching measured by various 
ind icators, numbers of stud ents ,  numbers of researchers , etc .  Let K be the number of 
8See [?] for an analysis of a model with externalities. 
9We thank Salvador Barbera for having suggested this problem. 
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such criteria. With respect to these criteria, voter i (say d epartment i )  is d escribed by 
the vector ,\i = (,\}, .... , ,\f) as to how "much" of each criterion voter i possesses. So,
,\[ might be a measure of d epartment i 's research output, AT might be a measure of the
number of stud ents enrolled in the d epartment i 's courses, and so on. 
Here, an alternative x is a d ecision on the relative weight of each criterion in allocating 
the bud get. Given an x the allocation of the bud get is such that voter (d epartment) i 
receives 
K ,\k M2:xk i k'k=l 2= 1::; j::;N \ 
For instance, if x2 = 1/3, then in the university example 1/3 of the bud get will be
>.� allocated based on the number of stud ents that a d epartment has. There, ' L:is;js;N AJ 
would measure the fraction of all stud ents that a given d epartment has. 
Presuming that voter i prefers to be allocated as much of the bud get as possible, we 
end up with preferences for voter i d escribed by 
for each k .  
3 Majority Voting and Tournaments 
Let us now d iscuss how we mod el the choice of alternatives mad e  by voters. 
The strict majority preference ind uced by a profile u of preferences is d enoted by T( u)
and d efi ned over X as follows. 
xT( u )y {:} # { i E N : ui · x > ui · y} > # { i E N : ui · y > ui · x}
If N is odd and ind ivid ual preferences are strict , then T = T( u) is complete. 10 Otherwise,
ties may occur and this results in some freed om in how one d efines the sets and proced ures 
that we examine next. 
For t he following d efinitions, T may be an arbitrary asymmetric (and possibly incom­
plete) bi nary relation. 
Condorcet Winners 
10 A binary relation which is asymmetric and complete is called a tournament. See [?) for an illumi­
nating account of the principal results in the vast literature on tournaments and majority voting. 
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An al ter native x is a Condorcet winner if : 
xTy for all y E X\ { x} . 
An al ter native x is a weak Condorcet winner if : 
not [yTx J for any y E X. 
Let W C(T) denote the set of weak Condor cet winner s associated with T. 
In the case wher e T is compl ete, the two defi nitions coincide. In fact , it is easy to see 
that whenever ther e is a Condor cet winner then that al ter native must al so be the unique 
weak Condor cet winner . H owever , in cases wher e T is incompl ete it is possibl e for ther e 
to exist many weak Condor cet winner s, in which case ther e  is no Condor cet winner . 
The Top Cycle 
As the major ity pr efer ence is not necessar il y tr ansitive, it can have cycl es. A pr omi­
nent cycl e that we r efer to in the sequel is the Top Cycl e  associated with T. 
Let a weak T-chain between al ter natives x and y be a sequence of al ter natives
x1 , . . .  , Xk such that x1 = x, xk = y ,  and not Xj+iTXj for each j = 1 ,  . . .  , k - 1 .
The Top Cycle of T ,  denoted by TC(T) is the set11 
TC(T) = {x I \:/y E X, 3 a weak T-chain betweenx and y} 
Thus, the Top Cycl e  is the set of al ter natives that can r each any al ter native in X via 
some weak T-chain. 
The Uncovered Set 
The Uncovered Set of T, denoted UC(T) , is the set of maximal el ements of the 
covering r el ation C(T) defi ned over X. Defi ning C(T) by 
xC(T)y  if and onl y if xTy and for all z E X : yTz impl ies xTz, 
UC(T) = {x I not yC(T)x\:/y E X}.  
Again, it shoul d be pointed out that when T is not compl ete, ther e ar e sever al possibl e 
of the Uncover ed Set. The defi nition above, which is the most r el evant for our subsequent 
anal ysis of the Banks Set , corr esponds to UCa in [?] ,  to Fa in [?] and to Mill er 's subset 
11 When the majority preference is not complete, there are various possible definitions of the Top Cycle 
(see[?] and[?]). All of these definitions coincide with the definition of TC considered in this paper when 
the majority preference is complete. 
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in [? ] .  It does not corr espond to the defi nition of the Uncover ed Set which is found in 
[? ] ,  [? ] ,  [? ] and [? ] .  Ther e, the Uncover ed Set is defi ned as the set of maximal elements 
of the par tial or der C(T) defi ned over X by 
xC(T)y iff xTy and for all z EX : [yTz implies xTz] and [zTx implies zTy] 
Let 
UC(T) = {x I not yC(T)xVy EX}. 
Since C(T) is a subr elation of C(T) , the Uncover ed Set that we focus on in this paper 
UC(T) is a subset of this other Uncover ed Set UC(T) . 
Amendment Agendas and Voting by Successive Elimination 
A pr ominent pr ocedur e that selects a single allocation out of the feasible set X is that 
based on amendment agendas, as centr al to Rober ts Par liamentar y Rules of Or der . This 
pr ocedur e, is also often r eferr ed to as voting by successive elimination in the liter atur e, 
and is defi ned as follows. 
Consider an or der ing CY of the finite set of alter natives X and let CY = (x1 , • • •  , XL)
wher e L denotes the number of alter natives in X. A vote is fir st taken to eliminate either 
XM or XM-l· The 'winning' alter native fr om the fir st r ound is compar ed to XM_2, and 
a vote is taken to eliminate either sur viving alter native fr om the fir st vote or x M-2, and 
so on. After (M - 1) compar isons, the last sur viving alter native is declar ed to be the
voting outcome. 
At each stage, the elimination of one alter native is accor ding to maj or ity voting, 
or mor e  gener ally accor ding to the binar y r elation T. This is well- specifi ed when T is 
complete. In cases wher e ther e ar e ties under the maj or ity pr efer ence r elation, or T is 
incomplete, the voting pr ocedur e needs to be mor e completely specifi ed. We do so as 
follows. At each stage allow individuals to vote for one of the two alter natives or to
abstain (in the case wher e they ar e indiffer ent) . In case of a tie in the voting between
alter natives Xz and xz1, x1 is elected if and only if x1 comes befor e x11 in the or der ing CY of 
voting; that is, l < l'. This favor s alter natives pr oposed ear lier in the agenda under ties, 
which is a natur al way to br eak ties given that they have not alr eady been br oken under 
T. 
In or der to deter mine the eventual voting outcome, it is also necessar y  to descr ibe 
how voter s  act . We consider the case wher e they vote str ategically at each stage, and 
so focus on the sophisticated voting outcome of this binar y voting pr ocedur e.12 This
is the outcome under the iter ative elimination of weakly dominated str ategies that has 
been well-studied. As demonstr ated by [?] ,  13 the sophisticated outcome induced by the 
12For more on sophisticated voting, see [?] and [?] . 
13The Shepsle-Weingast algorithm was defined for the case where T is complete. Our procedure of
breaking possible ties in the majority preference relation coming earlier in the ordering CY ensures that 
the sophisticated outcome can be derived from a straightforward variation on the algorithm derived by 
Shepsle and Weingast, as shown, for instance, in [?] . 
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ordering CT, denoted S (CT, T ) , is equal to w'J, which is the last element of the finite sequence 
described by the following algorithm: 
er d � ll l 1 er_ { Xz if X1T w'{t fo r  all l' < l, and w1 = X1 , an 10r a > Wz - er • w1_ 1 , otherwi se.
The Banks Set 
The Banks Set [? ] ,  denoted B(T ) , is the subset of alternatives which are sophisticated 
outcomes for at least one ordering of X. Formally, 
B (T ) = {x E W :  3CT E .E such that x = S(CT, u)} ,
where .E denotes the set of permutations of X.
Let a T-chain between alternatives x and y be a sequence of alternatives x1 , . .. , xk 
such that x1 = x, xk = y ,  and XjT xi+ 1 for each j = 1 ,  . . .  , k - 1 .
Given an alternative x E X, an x-chain of T is a chain H with x E H  such that xTy 
fo r  all y E H. The set of all x-chains is denoted H ( x, T ) . 
Thus, an x-chain is a chain where x beats all the other alternatives in the chain 
according to T .  
The characterization provided by [? ), stated to accommodate the possible incomplete­
ness, can be stated as follows. 
Proposition 6 (Reference [? ])
B (T ) = {x I 3H E H (x,T ) s.t . Vy¢:. H ::J z  E H  s.t. not yT z} . 
Thus, Banks showed that the outcomes found by varying the ordering (fo r  a fixed 
tournament) of the amendment agenda when voting by successive elimination correspond 
to the endpoints of chains, where the chains are such that any alternative not included in 
the ch ain is beaten by something in the chain. The intuition behind the characterization 
is that the alternatives in the chain are those who temporarily "win" at some stage in 
the voting (the wk' s in the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm) , and the remaining alternatives
are those who are eliminated at their stages. 
The fo llowing variation on well-known inclusions is helpful in what follows. 
Lemma 7 If T is an asymmetric binary relation, then WC(T ) C B (T ) C UC(T ) C 
T C(T ) . 
10 
The first inclusion is easily seen by noting th at any weak Condorcet winner fo rms 
a maximal T-cha in. This means that if the ordering is such that this weak Condorcet 
winner appears first in the order, then it will be the outcome of the amendment agenda, 
as no other alternative beats it. The second inclusion appears as theorem 4 . 1  in [?] . The 
third inclusion follows easily fr om the definitions. 
In what fo llows we use the notation WC ( u), B ( u), UC ( u), TC ( u) to denote the sets
WC(T(u)), B(T(u)), UC(T(u)), TC(T(u)). 
In the following sections, we examine the simplest framework for which the class of 
allocation problems described in the preceding section is not degenerate. If K = 2 or 
N = 2, there is always at least one weak Condorcet winner and all sets coincide with the
set of weak Condorcet winners . When K � 3 and N � 3, the set of (weak) Condorcet
winners is sometimes empty or some set of points that is not a singleton and not the whole
set , and the determination of TC, UC, and B becomes more challenging and interesting
as we have a true multidimensional problem. Thus, in what follows we restrict attention 
to the case of K = N = 3.
4 The Simple Geometry of the Majority Relation 
and the Top Cycle 
In this section, we consider the continuous version of X and assume, without loss of
generality, that M = 1 .  Under the assumption that K = N = 3, we are in position to
use the simple geometry of the triangle to support our formal arguments. Given these 
dimensionality assumptions, 
that is , X is the triangle represented on Fig. 1 .  The three vertices of the triangle are 
denoted e 1 , e 2 and e3 .
11  
1 ,· 
X3 (
\ 
·········•· ... .. ·· ... ··········· ... . · 
x, ········· :::?·':::::::::::'�:: ::::�::>y:. ... ,· ... . . .. 
.. ··
···· l ··········· ... 
0 .
.........
Figure 1 
Representation of the alternatives 
1 
Given u E uN and x E X, let U(u, x) be the set of alternatives that are considered
strictly superior to x by a maj ority, the so-called win set of x and by L( u, x) the set of
alternatives that are considered strictly inferior to x by a maj ority of voters. When there 
is no Condorcet winner, these two sets are the union of three simple sets as pictured in 
Fig. 2 .  
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2 
3
3 1
Figure 2 
The Win Set of x 
The following simple consequences of the linearity assumption on prefe rences will be 
very useful in the sequel. 
(a) If xT(u)y ,  z E X  and,\> 0, then >. x  + (1->. )z T(u) ,\ y + (1->. )z.
(b) If xT(u)y and>. , µ E [O, 1], then,\>µ implies ,\ x + (1->. )y T(u) µ x + (1- µ )y.
(c) An immediate consequence of (a) is that if U (x, u)-=/= 0, then U (u, x) intersects the 
boundary of X; a similar observation applies to L(u, x) .  
( d) We deduce from (b) that if x majority dominates y ,  then any point belonging to 
the line segment joining x and y majority dominates any other point of the segment 
which is farther away from x. 
In the rest of this section, we rule out preference profiles which either offer little 
interest or will be examined in some subsequent sections. In particular, we assume 
that each voter has a unique ideal point . It is straightforward to see that the linearity 
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assumption implie s that this ide al point is ne ce ssarily a ve rte x of the triangle; i .e . , the 
ide al point must be one of e1 , e2 or e3 . We also assume that the three ide al points are all 
diffe re nt ,  as othe rwise at le ast two vote rs have the same ide al point , which is the n  the 
unique Condorce t  winne r. Without loss of ge ne rality, le t ei be the ide al point of vote r i 
for all i = 1 ,  2, 3. Finally, we limit our atte ntion to the ge ne ric case whe re a give n vote r is
ne ve r indiffe re nt be twee n the ide al points of the two othe r  vote rs . A profile of pre fe re nce s 
u displaying the se feature s is de scribe d by matrix with three de gree s of free dom. A 
profile of pre fe re nce s  is comple te ly de scribe d by a ve ctor u - (v1 , v2 , v3) E (0, 1)3 whe re 
vi de note s  the inte nsity of the pre fe re nce of vote r i for his se cond be st choice among the 
ve rtice s. Within this class of line ar pre fe re nce profile s, two situations may appe ar: 
(1) None of the ve rtice s  dominate s the two othe r  ve rtice s. U p  to a pe rmutation of 
vote rs' labe ls, a profile of pre fe re nce s u in this cate gory is de scribe d by a matrix 
1 0 V3 
1 0 
1 
(2) One of the ve rtice s  majority dominate s the two othe r  ve rtice s. Whe n this happe ns, 
we call such a ve rte x a vertex Condorcet winner as it would be the obvious winne r if 
compe tition was limite d to the finite se t of ve rtice s. U p  to a pe rmutation of vote rs' 
labe ls, a profile of pre fere nce s u in this cate gory is de scribe d by a matrix 
1 
We first e xamine the conditions unde r  which a Condorce t  winne r e xists. 
Proposition 8 Let u ( v1 , v2 , v3) E (0, 1 )3 be a profile of preferences as described in
(1) and (2) above. x is a Condorcet winner for u, if and only if it is a vertex and u falls
in category (2) and satisfies v2 + v3 2: 1 (where up to a permutation of labels, vertex e1
is the winner) . 
Proposition ?? de parts in a fundame ntal way from Plott' s we ll- known ne ce ssary and 
suffi cie nt conditions for the e xiste nce of a Condorce t  winne r in the spatial mode l. His 
re sult asse rts that fo r  some alte rnative x to be a Condorce t winne r, it has to be that x is 
the ide al point of some vote r i and for any othe r  vote r j ,  the re e xists a vote r k such that 
the normalize d  gradie nts of the utility functions of j and k e valuate d in x are e xactly 
opposite . Since such symme try conditions are not robust to pe rturbations of pre fere nce s ,  
a corollary of Plott 's re sult is that Condorce t  winne rs do not e xist ge ne rically. It is ofte n 
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forgotten that this applies only if x is in the interior or relative interior of the feasible 
set, which is vacuously true if X is the entire Euclidean space. If, instead, like here, X is 
a compact convex subset of the Euclidean space, then Plott' s conditions do not apply to 
alternatives on the boundary.14 This applies systematically in our linear setting, since we
just demonstrated that Condorcet winners, when they exist , are on the boundary. The 
necessary and suffi cient condition stated in Proposition ?? is robust to perturbations. 
Let us make a final comment on the existence of Condorcet winners. The linear 
setting is a natural generalization of the finite setting and will be at least as complicated 
as the finite setting in that the majority tournament limited to the set of vertices can 
take any form. But the linear setting is richer in that a vertex doing well when matched 
exclusively against the other vertices may be defeated by a majority when compromises 
are introduced. Suppose u displays the pattern 
1 
Then e1 is a vertex Condorcet winner: voters 2 and 3 cannot agree on another vertex. 
Can they agree on something else? They can if the intensity of their preference for e1 is
not too large, as stated by the inequality v2 + v3 < 1 in Proposition ?? . The condition is 
fairly intuitive since if v2 and v3 are small enough then the gap between their second best 
and worst choices vanishes, and it becomes possible to find a compromise ..\e2 + (1 ->. )e3
preferred by both of them to e1 . Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the two conceivable situations .
14Reference [?] applies a budget constraint, but does not impose any nonnegativity constraints and so 
does not consider boundary issues in the manner considered here. 
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Figure 3 
A Condorcet Winner 
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Figure 4 
A "Vertex" Condorcet Winner 
which is not a Condorcet Winner 
The following proposition provides a complete description of TC ( u) when u = ( v1, v2, v3) E 
(0, 1)3 is a profile of preferences as described above. 
Proposition 9 Let u be a profile of preferences as described in (1) or (2) above. Then1
either there is a Condorcet winner1 or TC(u) = X1 or TC(u) = X\ {ei} for some i. 
Proposition ?? is a version of McKelvey's chaos theorem in our linear setting. The 
proof off ered in the appendix shows how a cycle connecting any two alternatives is con­
structed , and the problems raised by the existence of a boundary are addressed. In 
contrast to the conditions leading to the existence of a Condorcet winner, the boundary 
does not have much impact here, as the only d eparture from total chaos is the exclusion 
of a Condorcet loser, when there is one. 
5 The Goods and Bads Model 
In this section, we return to the discrete version of the problem, still keeping with N = 
K = 3 .  We focus on the goods and bads model of example ?? and characterize all of the 
sets, including the Banks and U ncovered Sets. 
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Let us first start with the an alysis of a promin en t case that falls in the goods an d 
bads model: that of the divide the dollar model. 
Proposition 10 Consider the divide the dollar model of Example ?? . The set of weak 
Condorcet winners is empty) the Top Cycle is the whole set of alternatives) and the 
Uncovered Set is the set of alternatives excluding the vertices. The Banks Set includes 
every x E X  such that xi < [ (xj + xk)2 + 5 (xj + xk) - 4]/2J for some i and distinct j)
k. Thus) the size of the Banks Set converges to the size of the set of alternatives as the
grid becomes finer (limM_,00 #;iu) = 1). However) the Banks Set is a strict subset of the
Uncovered Set for any M > 5; as (M - 1, 1, 0) and permutations of these points are not
in the Banks Set. 1 5 
Proposition ?? provides a differen t  view of the Ban ks Set than what is previously 
kn own . While in some fin ite settin gs with arbitrary preferen ces, on e can fin d examples 
where the Ban ks Set is a strict subset of the Un covered Set (see [?]) , it was n ot kn own 
whether this was true in more n aturally structured environ men ts. In deed, [?] shows that 
in an in fin itely divisible version of a divide the dollar game with three players, the Ban ks 
Set an d Un covered Set coin cide.16 Here, in con trast, the Ban ks Set makes a selection 
from the Un covered Set. As the in divisibilities disappear, the sets con verge to each other, 
with the Ban ks Set always remain in g a strict subset of the Un covered Set . 
Let us n ow return to the more gen eral an alysis of the goods an d bads model, where 
players may agree on which dimen sion s are goods, an d may like several dimen sion s. 
Let sk = L:i uf an d s = L:k sk = L:i L:k uf. Note that s E {O, 1, . . .  , 9}, an d
sk E {O, 1, 2, 3} . 
Thus, sk is the stren gth of the support for dimen sion k .  The an alysis of the various
sets n ow depen ds on the relative stren gths of the dimen sion s. 
Proposition 11 Consider the goods and bads model from Example?? ) and assume that 
at least one voter is not completely indifferent. Without loss of generality) label the 
dimensions so that s1 2:: s2 2:: s3 . 
(1) If one dimension dominates the others (s1 > s2 )) then the vertex corresponding to
that dimension is a Condorcet winner and all the sets coincide (TC(u) = UC(u) = 
B (u) = WC(u) = { (M, 0 , O)}) . 
15For larger M, one can also check that (M - 2, 2, 0) and (M - 2, 1, 1) (and permutations) are not in
the Banks Set, and so forth; but the proofs become increasingly tedious as the number of chains to be 
ruled out grow as we move away from the vertices. 
16Penn's definition of the Banks Set in infinite settings is directly in terms of maximal chains rather 
than in terms of an agenda, and her tie-breaking rule is different from ours. It is not clear that there 
is an unambiguously appealing definition of the Banks Set in the infinite setting, as without some 
modifications of tie-brealdng there does not exist any maximal chains. 
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(2) If there are two dimensions that have the same strength and dominate the third
(81 = s2 > 83 ), then there is no Condorcet winner and the sets include all points
that allocate only to the first two dimensions (TC(u) = UC(u) = B(u) = WC(u) = 
{x I x3 = O}). 
(3) In the case where the strength of support for the three dimensions is identical (s1 = 
82 = 83 ) : 
{3a} If some voter is completely indifferent, then no alternative beats any other, 
and so X = WC(u) = B(u) = UC(u) = TC(u) . 
{3b} If each voter views a different two dimensions as goods, then WC(u) = 
{ (M, 0, 0) , (0, M, 0), (0, 0, M)}, while TC(u) = X, and B(u) = UC(u) = X \ 
{ (M 2, 1, 1) , (1, M  - 2, 1) ,  (1, 1, M - 2)}. 
{3c} If each voter views one dimension as a good then we are back in the divide 
the dollar game setting as characterized in Proposition ?? . 
Proposition ?? states that the anal ysis of the goods and bads model breaks into 
five cases, ba sicall y depending on how much agreement there is among the voters a s  to 
which d imensions are goods. When there is enough agreement (as in (1) or (2) ) ,  then 
the predictions are narrow, whil e when there is significant disagreement (as in (3a) (3b)
and (3c)) then many voting cycl es appear and the sets are nearer to the entire space.
Interestingl y, the onl y situation where something fall s in between is in the divide the 
doll ar game with small er M (substantial indivisibil ities) where the Banks Set is narrower
than the U ncovered Set and Top Cycl e. 
More specificall y, in the first ca se, there is some dimension that receives more support 
than any other, and then giving the full budget to this dimension is a Condorcet winner. 
In the second case, there are two dimensions that are viewed as goods by an equal number 
of voters and the third dimension is viewed as a good by a l esser number. Here, the set 
of weak Condorcet winners is the set of al ternatives that give onl y to the two dimensions 
with broader support . In the third, fourth, and fifth cases, all of the dimensions have 
equal su pport. However, they behave quite differentl y. In the third case, no al ternative 
beats any other, as the two voters who are not indifferent compl etel y  disagree on the 
goods and bads, and so all sets are the whol e space. In the fourth case, the three vertices 
form the set of Weak Condorcet winners. The Top Cycl e is the whol e set X, whil e the 
Banks and U ncovered Sets are al most the entire set X. The fift h  ca se refers to the divide 
the dolla r game, a s  al ready discussed. 
6 Beyond the Goods and Bads Model 
We have offered a compl ete description of WC(u) , TC(u) and UC(u) , and some bounds 
on the description of B ( u) , for the goods and bads model . In this section, we retu rn to the 
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.more general linear model. In Sect . 4, we analyzed that model in terms of understanding 
the Top Cycle. We now return to that analysis to see what we can say about the 
Uncovered Set . 
Precisely, we focus on the generic case where there is not a Condorcet winner and the 
profile of preferences is described by the pattern 
1 
where 0 < v1 , v2 , v3 < 1. Thus, e1 is a vertex Condorcet winner, as it beats the other
vertices in a majority contest. 
What does the U ncovered Set look like in such a setting? If e1 is a Condorcet winner, 
then obviously UC ( u) = { e1 } .  So let us assume that e1 is not a Condorcet winner. From 
Proposition ?? , this holds true if and only if v2 + v3 < 1. In such a case, TC(u) rules
out the Condorcet loser e3 , but none of the points arbitrarily close to e3 . The following 
proposition demonstrates that there is a neighborhood of e3 which is outside UC(u) . 
The proof technique is based on the following simple but useful lemma which follows 
immediately from the definition of covering ( C (T)) .  
Lemma 12 x E UC(u) if and only if for all y E Y either not yTx or there exists z EX
such that xT z and not yT z .
This lemma states a version of the two- step principle (a terminology due to Miller 
and McKelvey) . Indeed, the lemma states that to be in the Uncovered Set an alternative
x must weakly majority dominate any other alternative in either one step or two steps; 
and if there are two steps then the first component of the weak T- chain must be strict. 
Let L2 (x) be the set (X\U(u, x)) U (UyEL(u,x) (X\U (u ,  y)) ) . 17 The lemma asserts that
x E UC(u) if and only if L2 (x) = X. 
Proposition 13 Let u be as discussed above and x = (x1 , x2) EX. Then, x E UC(u) if 
and only if 
It is interesting to note that the condition in Proposition ?? does not involve v3. If
v1 = v2 = v, then the condition in the Proposition is simply that :
Obviously, from Proposition ?? it follows that the Uncovered Set rules out many 
points around e3 . This is a first step in an exploration of UC ( u) . This provides the 
17The notation L2 is justified by the fact that when T is a tournament , L2(x) = L(u,x) U 
(UyEL(u,x)L(u, y)). 
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interesting conclusion that the U ncovered Set is a subset of the space of alternatives that 
depends in interesting ways on the utility profile. 
Likely, a similar analysis can be conducted in the case where there is no vertex 
Condorcet winner. 
7 The Mixed Private versus Public Goods Model 
In this final section, we investigate the mixed private versus public goods model defined 
as Example ??. In this model, a profile of preferences is identified by the single positive 
parameter b describing the common willingness to pay of each voter for the public project. 
To emphasize this specificity, we use the notation WC(b) , TC(b) and UC(b) instead of 
WC(u) , TC(u) and UC(u) . The following proposition describes the dependence of the 
three sets18 upon the parameter b. 
Proposition 14 Consider the mixed private versus public goods model from Example ?? .
(1) If the benefit from the public good is large (b > VJ then allocating the entire
budget to the public good is a Condorcet Winner (and thus) WC(b) = UC(b) = TC(b) = 
(0, 0, 0, M) ). 
(2) If the benefit from the public good is intermediate (� < b < �)) then there are no
weak Condorcet winners) the Top Cycle is the whole set of alternatives) and the Uncovered 
Set is the set of alternatives such that at most two voters get a positive amount of the 
private good and no voter gets the entire supply of the private good (UC(b) = {x E X  : 
Xi = 0 for at least one i E {1 ,  2, 3} and xk # M for any k E {1, 2, 3}}) .
(3) If the benefit from the public good is small (b < VJ then the sets look like they do in
the divide the dollar game (WC(b) = 0) UC(b) = { x E X :  x4 = 0 and xk # M for any k }  
and TC(b) = X). 
Proposition ?? demonstrates that the presence of the public project has an impact 
on the d istributive politics component of the budget allocation. If the benefit from the 
public g ood is suffi cient, then it swamps the private allocation, as in (1) .  If it is too 
small, then the problem becomes similar to the divide the dollar game, as in (3) . In 
the middle case, we see some interesting impact of the public good. One voter among 
the three should derive his payoff exclusively from public consumption. This is due to 
the fact that when b > �' the Bowen- Lindahl- Samuelson first order optimality condition
rules out any interior allocation. Since the U ncovered Set is a subset of the Pareto set , 
this provides an upper bound. We prove that, in fact , the two sets coincide. 
18We have not calculated the Banks Set in this model. 
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8 Concluding Remarks and Higher Dimensions 
We have shown that it is possible to mak e predictions about the nature of voting equilibria 
under majoritarian rule that are not too sensitive to specific institutional details, even 
in multi- dimensional policy space. We did this by analyzing budget allocation problems 
where voters' preferences are linear. 
Section 4 describes the geometric structure of the Top Cycle set. Proposition ?? 
showed that if there is a Condorcet winner, then it must be a vertex. We also found that 
the conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists extend Plott 's analysis because 
they are applicable even when a Condorcet winner lies on the boundary of the feasible set -
which is absent from his analysis. Having a boundary on the problem provides a different 
perspective than one gets from Plott 's analysis, and the possibility of a Condorcet winner 
is no longer so extreme. Proposition ?? is the counterpart of Mckelvey's chaos theorems, 
and shows that if a Condorcet winner does not exist , then the Top Cycle set is virtually 
the entire set - at most it excludes the three vertices. So, while we still come to the 
conclusion that the Top Cycle is either a single point or the whole space, the conditions 
under which it is a single point are no longer so extreme. 
We went on to consider the goods and bads model, where voters view each dimension 
as either a good or a bad. Proposition ?? demonstrates that there are cases where the 
Banks Set and U ncovered Sets are strict subsets of the feasible set, even in situations 
where no Condorcet winner exists. The Banks Set is generally a strict subset of the 
U ncovered Set, but the difference between the two sets disappears as the divisibility of 
the budget becomes finer. 
In sect. ?? ,  we returned to the more general linear preference fr amework of sect . ??, 
but restrict attention to the analysis of preference profiles which give rise to a vertex 
Condorcet winner. We characterize the U ncovered Set and show that it excludes a 
neighborhood of points close to the vertex Condorcet loser . This provides an interesting 
setting in which the U ncovered Set makes pointed predictions about the outcome of any 
majority rule based collective decision. 
Finally, sect. ?? looks at the "mixed" public and private goods model (Example ??) .
Not surprisingly, voters' common willingness to pay for the public good turns out to be 
the crucial parameter in this model. If this willingness to pay is very high, then the 
entire budget will be spent in production of the public good under majoritarian rule. 
Conversely, if the willingness to pay is low, then the U ncovered Set excludes production 
of the public good.  The interesting case is when the common willingness to pay takes on 
an intermediate value, and then the U ncovered Set predicts that at least one voter must 
be excluded from consumption of the private good. 
The bulk of our analysis was in the special case where there are three projects and 
three voters, as that case is still tractable and yet introduces the full force of multi­
dimensionality. Certainly, it is worthwhile to explore beyond this. While the extension 
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to more than three projects and/ or three voters does not raise conceptual diffi culties , it 
is obviously much trickier. One reason is that the linear model is at least as diffi cult as 
the finite model and therefore moving to l arger K compl icates the combinatorics of the 
problem, as we know from the theory of majority tournaments. We have listed bel ow 
several directions of investigation that seem promising to explore as a continuation of the 
anal ysis performed here. 
• What happens to the goods and bads model in higher dimensions? The fol lowing
conjecture might be considered. 
Conjecture: Consider the goods and bads model, and a case where there is some 
dimension k that a strict majority of agents view as a good. Let J be the set of agents 
who think k is a good and let A =  {k' : such that uf' = 1 for some i E J}. If x E UC(u)
and£¢:. A, then xe < K .  
• It seems that Proposition ?? generalizes to higher dimensions. A Condorcet win­
ner will have to be a vertex. What conditions ensure that this vertex Condorcet is a 
Condorcet winner? U sing Farkas' Lemma, it seems that a complete characterization of 
preference profiles for which this holds is possibl e! Once again, this will depart fr om 
Plott' s symmetry conditions. 
•It seems that we can also general ize Proposition ?? to higher dimensions, as fol ows.
Define the vertex Top Cycle, denoted VTC(u) , to be the subset of vertices that are in 
the Top Cycle of the majority weak tournament restricted to the vertices and the vertex 
bottom cycle, denoted V BC( u) , to be the subset of vertices that are in the bottom cycle 
of the majority weak tournament restricted to the vertices. We conjecture that 
TC(u) = {x E X: xk = 0 fo r  al l ek E VBC(u) } .
This implies that if a vertex is in the vertex top cycle, then it is in the Top Cycle, 
but the converse does not hol d, as we know al ready from the case where K = N = 3.
• The computation of the U ncovered Set does not seem out of reach either. One
preliminary question we may ask could be the following. Define the Vertex Uncovered 
Set to be the subset of vertices which are in the U ncovered Set of the majority weak 
tournament restricted to the vertices. Is it true that a vertex is in the Vertex U ncovered 
Set must also be in the U ncovered Set? We know that the converse does not hold from 
Proposition ?? . 
• Finally, a detail ed exploration of Example ?? woul d be valuable. It is straightfor­
ward to check that if there is a Condorcet winner, it must give the whol e allocation to 
the publ ic project . Furthermore, this project is a Condorcet winner if and onl y if 
b > 1 
- (1;r + 1
The following conjecture, extending Proposition ?? , could be considered. 
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Conjecture: Consider the private versus public goods model. If b > Ja for some
positive integer M, then x E UC(b) =} #{i : xi > O} < M. Furthermore, if b < M1_1 , then UC(b) = {x E X: Xi = 0 for at least N - M + 1 voters} . 
Note that the first assertion is true from an analysis of the Pareto set. Only the 
second assertion remains to be proved. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition ??: Let x be a Condorcet winner for u. We first show that x 
must be on the boundary of the triangle. Assume to the contrary that x is in the interior 
of X. Then, for all i ,  j E N, the indifference lines of voters i and j passing through x 
must be identical, as otherwise ,  there would exist y in the neighborhood of x such that 
ui · y > ui · x and Uj · y > Uj · x, contradicting our assumption that x is a Condorcet 
winner. This implies that the slopes of the indifference lines of voters i and j through x 
are the same, so that ViVj = 1. This cannot be, as there is no solution (v1 , v2 , v3) E (0, 1)3
to the system of equations 
So we have shown that a Condorcet winner must be on the boundary of X. 
Next , we show that a Condorcet winner must be a vertex. We know from above that 
a Condorcet winner x can be written as x = >. ei + (1 ->. ) ej for some 0 < >. < 1. Then, 
either uk · ei > uk · ej , in which case ei majority dominates ej via the coalition { i ,  k }; or , 
Uk · ei < uk · ej , in which case ej majority dominates ei via the coalition {j , k } .  Therefore, 
either>. =  0 or,.\= 1, and the Condorcet winner must be a vertex. 
We complete the proof by showing that (2) must apply and that Vj + Vk 2:: 1 for some 
j and k .  Without loss of generality, let x = e1 . Then, u must f all in (2) and it must be 
that either 
1 1 
or u = 0 
V1
Indeed, since e1 majority dominates e2 and e3 , then either e3 is the worst choice for 1
and 2 or e2 is the worst choice for 1 and 3. Without loss of generality, consider the first 
case. For e1 to be Condorcet winner it is necessary and suffi cient that there not exist 
(y i, Y2) E X such that 
It is straightforward to check that this system of inequalities is consistent with (Y1 , y2) E
X if and only if v2 + v3 < 1. I
Proof of Proposition ?? : Assume that there is no Condorcet winner. We distin­
guish two cases. 
Case 1: There is no vertex Condorcet winner.
In this case, up to a permutation, e1T(u)e2T(u)e3T(u)e1 and from (d) above, the 
cycle extends to the whole boundary of X: for any two points z and w on the boundary 
there is a weak T- chain between z and w. Now take x and y in X. Since there is no 
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Condorcet winner, we deduce from ( c) above that there exist z and w on the boundary 
of X such that xT(u)z  and wT(u)y. The existence of a weak T- chain between x and y 
follows from the juxtaposition of the three weak T- chains. This proves that TC ( u) = X. 
Case 2: There is a vertex Condorcet winner.
Without loss of generality, assume that e1 is the vertex Condorcet winner. Since e1 is 
not a Condorcet winner, there exists z on the segment [e2 , e3] such that zT(u)e1 . From 
(b) above, we deduce that e1T(u)e2T(u)zT(u)e1 and from (d) above the cycle extends to 
the entire boundary of the triangle with vertices e1 , e2 and z, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5 
The "Cycles" on the boundary 
of the triangle 
1 
We first show that for all x, y E [ e1 , e2] U [ e2 , e3] U [ e2 , e3] U [ e1 , z] such that x =/= e3 ,
there exists a weak T-chain from x to y. For any x E [ e1 , e2] U [ e2 , e] U [e, e1], the
claim follows from the existence of a cycle as in claim. Consider now the case where 
x E [e1 , e3] U [e, e3] with x =/= e3 . The idea is to construct a weak T- chain starting from x
and ending in h belonging to the smaller triangle with vertices e1 , e2 and z; once there, we 
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just demonstrated that you can anywhere else on the boundary of X. The construction 
goes as follows. 
First consider f E [&:, e3] and let g be the intersection of [e1 , e3] with the indifference 
line of voter 2 passing through f .  Given the slopes of the indifference line of voters 2 and 3, it is easy to see that this point is well defined and that u3 • g > u3 • f .  Then, define
h as being the intersection of the indifference line of voter 3 with either [&:, e1] or [&:, e3] .
Given the slopes of the indifference lines of voters 1 and 3 ,  it is easy t o  see that this
point is well defined and that u1 • h > u1 · g. We have obtained the short weak T- chain
fT(u)gT(u)h .  This is illustrated in Fig. 6.
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Construction of h 
\ ·· · .... � 3 
"L----- 1 
If h E [&:, e1] ,  we have completed the desired argument. If instead, h E [&:, e3] ,  it is 
easy to show that I h - e3 l > I  f - e3 J .  Starting from h, we repeat the argument above
to obtain g' and h' E [&:, e1] U [&:, e3] .  If h' E [&:, e1] ,  we are done. Otherwise, we continue
this process. After a finite number of steps, we will obtain a point in [&:, e1] .  This is 
illustrated in Fig. 7. 
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Connection to [e1 , Z] 
el 
1 
The case where f E [e1 , e3] follows from (a) above, since f = .Ae1 + (1 - .A) e3 for some 
.A E JO ,  1[  and e1T(u)w for all w E k, e3 [, we deduce that JT(u).Aw + (1 - .A)e3 . The 
connection involving points in the interior of X is done as in case 1. This completes the 
proof of the claim that TC ( u) = X\ { e3} .  I 
Proof of Proposition ??:  First , note that yTx implies that y exceeds x on exactly two 
dimensions. 
From this it is clear that there are no weak Condorcet winners, as for any alternative 
there exists some other alternative that gives more to two of the dimensions (given that 
M ;::: 4) . 
Next, let us check that the Uncovered Set is the set of all points less the vertices. 
Consider x = (u, v ,  w) that is defeated by some y = (a, b, c) . Without loss of generality,
let a >  u ,  b > v ,  and c :s; w - 2. Consider z = (M - c - 1, 0, c +  1) . Here, provided v > 0,
x beats z and yet z beats y. Thus, y cannot cover x. This implies that the only covered 
points could be the vertices. Indeed, the vertices never beat any point , and are beaten 
by any interior point , and so are covered. 
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To verify that the Top Cycle is X, we only need to check that the vertices are in the 
Top Cycle, as the other alternatives are all uncovered. We need to check that from any 
vertex, say x = (M, 0, 0) , and any other alternative y there is a weak T- chain. If y has 
a 0 in either of the last two dimensions, then x and y are non- comparable, and so there 
is a weak T-chain directly. Thus consider any alternative y = (u, v ,  w), where v > 0 and 
w > 0. Let z = (u + 1 ,  v + w - 1 ,  0). Then x is non-comparable to z and z defeats y, so 
there is a weak T-chain from x to y. This completes the proof of the Top Cycle. 
The claims about the Banks Set are established as follows. Let us identify a maximal 
T-chain with x = (u, v, w) , where u 2 v 2 w, at the end. 
Consider the case where u > v + w. (u, v, w) ,  (u - l , v + 2, w - l ) ,  (u - 4, v + 6, w - 2) ,  
. . .  (u  - ci , v + i + ci, w - i), . . .  where i is the index of the step until w - i hits 0 ,  then 
(u - ci , v - i + w, i + ci) for the remaining steps until v + w - i hits 0. Let us define ci , 
and let i* be the smallest i for which u - (i2 + 3i - 2)/2 :::; v + w - i. Then for i < i*
set Ci = (i2 + 3i - 2)/2 For i 2 i* set Ci = u - (v + w) + i. Let us prove that this
chain is maximal. Suppose that y = (a, b, d) beats everything in the chain. It cannot 
be that b :::; v, as then there is some point in the chain with middle entry b. Similarly 
d :::; w is not possible. So b > v and d > w. Thus it must be that a :::; u - 2.  It cannot 
be that a :::; u - ci* , as then there is some step with first entry a. So, it must be that 
a > u - Ci* . Without loss of generality then, take a = u - Ci + 1, for some i < i* . Then 
it must be that b and d beat all the second and third entries above this. This means 
that b + d 2 v + w + ci-l + (i - 1) + 1 + 1  [either beating the highest second entry and 
w + 1 ,  or the highest third entry and v + 1 if we are already in the second part of the 
algorithm] We also know from the value of a that v + w + ci - 1 2 b + d. This implies 
that ci 2 ci-l +i + 2. This does not hold by the definition of ci , which solving inductively
amounts to Ci 2 (i2+5i-4)/2, which cannot hold given that u < ((v+w)2+5(v+w)-4)/2.
So, we have reached a contradiction. 
So, to complete the proof consider the case where u :::; v + w and let us identify a 
maximal T-chain with x = (u, v, w) at the end. (u, v, w) , (u 1 ,  v + 2, w - l) ,  (u - 2, v + 
4, w - 2) ,  . . .  (u - i, v + 2i, w - i) , . . .  where i is the index of the step until w - i hits 0, 
then (u - i, v + w - i, 2i) for the remaining steps until u - i hits 0. Note first that this 
chain of length u + 1 is well defined; indeed, when i = u, v + w - i 2 0. Let us prove that 
this chain is maximal. Assume on the contrary that y = (a, b, d) beats everything in the 
chain. It cannot be that a :::; u, as then there is some point in the chain with first entry 
a. Similarly d :::; w is not possible. The same reasoning show that b is such that either
b > v or b < v + w - u. The first case is not possible as it implies a + b + d > u + v + w 
which is not possible. Consider the second case. Since (a, b, d) beats all alternatives in 
the chain, we deduce from b < v + w - u  that (a, b, d) is preferred by voters 1 and 3 to any 
alternative in the chain. This implies a >  u and d > 2u and therefore, since u 2 v 2 w, 
a +  b + d 2 a +  d > 3u 2 u + v + w, which is not possible. 
Finally let us show that for any M > 5, (M -1 ,  1, 0) and its permutations are not in the 
Banks Set, and so B(u) =/= UC(u) . The only alternatives that this beats are (k, 0, M - k)
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for k < M - 1. The only chains that could conceivably be maximal are then of the form 
(k ,  0, M - k) ,  (M - 1, 1, 0) . If k < M - 3, then the alternative (M - 3, 2, 1) beats both. 
If k � M - 3, then (0, 2 ,  M - 2) beats both (provided M - 2 > M - (M - 3) = 3, so 
when M > 5) .  I 
Proof of Proposition ?? :  
Case (1) is easily checked directly. 
Let us check (2) . 
If 81 = 82 = 3 > 83 , then it must be that every voter weakly prefers any allocation 
x with x3 = 0 to any allocation y with y3 =I- 0, and some voter has a strict preference
between any two such allocations. Moreover, all voters are indifferent between any two 
allocations that have x3 = 0, and so the set of weak Condorcet winners is the set { x I x3 = 
O}. Since any allocation outside of this set is defeated by one inside this set , this is the 
Top Cycle. Also , since the set of weak Condorcet winners is a subset of the Banks Set , 
the claim follows from Lemma ?? noting that {x I x3 = O} = WC(u) c B(u) C UC(u) C 
TC(u) = {x I x3 = O}.
If 81 = 82 = 2 > 83 , then it can be checked that any allocation x with x3 = 0 defeats 
any allocation y with y3 =I- 0. [Such a y gets at most one vote versus such an x ,  and such
an x always gets at least one vote versus such a y. For any configuration of preferences 
that fits in this case where such a y gets one vote, it must be that such an x gets two votes.] 
Also, there must be one voter who is indifferent between all allocations in {x I x3 = O},
while the other two agents split on it . Thus, again the set of weak Condorcet winners is 
the set { x I x3 = 0}, and any allocation outside of this set is defeated by one inside this 
set. So the rest of the proof is as in the case above. 
If 81 = 82 = 1 > 83 = 0, then either there is one voter who thinks both dimensions 
1 and 2 are goods, and other voters are completely indifferent , or there are two voters 
who each like one of the two dimensions, and the other voter is indifferent between all 
allocations. In either situation it is clear that the set of weak Condorcet winners is the 
set { x I x3 = O}, and any allocation outside of this set is defeated by one inside this set , 
as in the earlier cases. 
Next , let us consider (3a) . In this case, without loss of generality, suppose that voter 
1 views dimension 1 as a good,  voter 2 views dimensions 2 and 3 as goods, and voter 3 
is completely indifferent. If we consider two alternatives that have the same allocation 
to dimension 1, then all voters are indifferent between these alternatives. If we consider 
two alternatives that have different allocations between dimension 1 ,  then voters 1 and 
2 will have opposing preferences over the alternatives. Thus, any two alternatives are 
non- comparable under T(u) . 
Next , let us consider (3b) . Note that no two voters agree on which dimensions are 
goods. There is one voter who likes dimensions 1 and 2 ,  one who likes 2 and 3 ,  and one 
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who like s  1 and 3. One ke y obse rvation is that if yT(u)x in this case , it must be that y
e xcee ds x on e xactly one dime nsion and is le ss than x on the two re maining dime nsions. 
(If it is the same on any dime nsion the n  the y  are non- comparable . If y e xcee ds x on 
two dime nsions, the n  the sum of the re maining dime nsion toge the r  with e ithe r  othe r 
dime nsion is gre ate r unde r x, and x will win.) This re sults in the following obse rvations
about T(u) . 
(a) Any two alte rnative s  which agree on some dime nsion are non- comparable to e ach
othe r. 
(b) Any ve rtex will be at any alte rnative that is positive on the othe r  two dime nsions.
From (a) and (b) it follows that the ve rtice s  are not be ate n by any alte rnative , and
from (b) , it follows that any othe r  alte rnative is be ate n by some ve rte x. Thus the se t of
we ak Condorce t  winne rs is e xactly the se t of ve rtice s. 
Ne xt , le t us show that UC(u) = X \ {(M - 2, 1 ,  1 ) ,  (1 ,  M - 2 , 1 ) ,  ( 1 ,  1 ,  M - 2)} _ X*. 
First, we show that x = (M - 2 ,  1 , 1) is not in the U ncove re d Se t .  Le t y = (M, 0, 0) .  
The n, yTx. Suppose not yTz. The n, from (b) , e ithe r  z2 = 0 or z3 = 0. Without loss of
ge ne rality, suppose z2 = 0. In orde r  for x to be at z, x has to be bigge r  than z in just one 
compone nt, and smalle r  than z in the othe r  two compone nts. Since z2 = 0, this me ans 
that x1 < z1 and x3 < z3 . But this is not possible . So, xTz implie s  yTz. He nce , x is 
cove re d. Analogous argume nts e stablish that (1 ,  M - 2, 1) and ( 1 ,  1 ,  M - 2) are cove re d. 
Ne xt, we show that no othe r  e le me nt in X* is cove re d. 
Each ve rte x  forms a maximal chain as a single ton and so is in the Banks Se t and thus 
the U ncove re d  Se t .  
Ne xt, conside r an alte rnative x E X* that has two dime nsions positive and the othe r
0 .  Without loss of ge ne rality, say x = (a,  M - a, 0) whe re a 2 M - a.  This alte rnative
be ats (0, M - 1 ,  1 ) .  Note also that any alte rnative y that has y3 2 1 doe s  not be at 
(0 ,  M - 1 ,  1) (the vote r who like s  the last two dime nsions is at be st indiffe re nt ,  and the 
vote r who like s  the first two dime nsions pre fers (0, M - 1 ,  1)) . Thus only alte rnative s
with y3 = 0 be at (0, M - 1 ,  1 ) .  The n, it follows from (a) that forming a chain of x and
(0, M - 1 ,  1) is a maximal chain that re sults in x, and so x is in the Banks Se t ,  and thus 
the U ncove re d Se t . Ne xt, conside r  an inte rior alte rnative x = (x1 , x2 , x3) E X* . Without
loss of ge ne rality, assume that x1 2 x2 2 x3 . Note that since x E X* ,  x2 2 2. 
Suppose yTx and y is an inte rior alte rnative in X. Without loss of ge ne rality, le t 
yi < xi , yi < xi and yk > xk . Of course , such i, j ,  k must e xist. So, yi � xi - 1 ,
yi � xi - 1 ,  yk 2 xk + 2 .  This must me an that xi 2 2 ,  xi 2 2 since y is inte rior by
assumption. Now, conside r  z such that zi = 0, zi = xi + xi - 1 ,  and zk = xk + 1. The n,
xTz, but zTy. So, x cannot be cove re d  by y.
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Next, suppose that yTx and y is not an interior point . If y1 = 0, then choose 
z = (0, x2 + 1 ,  x3 + x1 - 1 ) .  Since x1 2: 2, we have xTz. But, by (a) , y and z are
non- comparable. So, y does not cover x. 
If y2 = 0, then choose z = (x1 + 1, 0, x3 + x2 - 1) . Note that since x E X*, x2 2: 2.
Again, xTz, but y and z are non- comparable. 
The last possibility is that y3 = 0. Since yTx, there is i such that yi 2: xi + 2. Choose
z such that zi = xi + 1 < yi , zk = 0 where k =/= 0, and z3 = M - xi - 1 .  Since x2 2: 2,
check that z3 > x3 . It follows that xTz and yTz. So, x is not covered. 
Thus, we have shown that U C(u) = X* , and so Lemma ?? implies that X* c TC(u) . 
Now, consider x = (M - 2, 1 ,  1 ) .  We show that there is a weak T- chain connecting x to 
each of the vertices. Take (M, 0, 0) . Then, the weak T- chain is (x, (M- 2, 0, 2) , (M, 0, 0)) .  
Weak T- chains t o  other vertices are obvious extensions of this weak T- chain. Similarly, 
there is a weak T- chain from x to any other point in X. Hence, TC(u) = X. 
Next, let us identify the Banks Set. Our arguments above already show that the Banks 
Set includes all alternatives that are not in the interior. Consider x = (x1 , x2 , x3) in the
interior. Without loss of generality, let x1 2: x2 2: x3 2: 1 ,  and since B ( u) c U C  (u) = X*,
we know that x2 2: 2. 
Let k+ be the smallest integer greater than or equal to k, and k- the greatest integer
smaller than or equal to k. 
Let us build a T- chain that ends in x and argue that it is maximal. This shows that 
x is in the Banks Set . 
The first element in the chain is x. The next part of the sequence are the alternatives 
( x1 + 1 ,  x2 - 2, x3 + 1 ) ,  ( x1 + 2, x2 - 4, x3 + 2) , . . . , ( x1 + ( �2 )- , 0, x3 + ( �2 ) +) .
Denote x1 = x1 + ( x2 ) - and x3 = x3 + ( x2 )+M 2 ' M 2 · 
The last part of the sequence is ( x}w-2' x
2+1 ,  x'.tr+ 1) '  . . . ' ( 0' x
2 + c� )-' x'.tr + ( x�1 ) +) .
It is easy to check that this is a chain. Let us show that it is maximal. 
Suppose y beats everything in the chain. Consider the case where y1 > x1 . The chain 
contains without any gap everything from x1 to x}w. So, y1 > x}w. But , then y cannot 
beat (x11 ,  0, x'.tr ) .  The same argument rules out cases where y2 > x2 . So we are left with
the case y3 > x3 . In the third dimension, the chain contains all consecutive elements 
1 (x1 ) + (xl ) +from X to x'.tr + "ft except possibly19 X�I - 1 and x'.tr + "ft - 1 .  
19There are no gaps if x2 and xlr are even. 
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Suppose y3 = xit- - 1 .  Since y3 > xL - 2, we need y2 < 3. But ,  then y1 ;:::=: x1- - 1 .  
So, y does not beat (x1- - 1 , 3 , xit- - 2) , which is the element just before (x1-, 0, xit-) .
An analogous argument works if y3 = xit- + ( x�) + - 1. 
(3c) follows from Proposition ??. I 
Proof of Proposition ?? :  Let x = (x1, x2 ) E X. We examine the indifferences lines of
voters 1 and 2 through x. The four possible cases are: 
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [e2, e3] and the indifference line
of voter 2 through x intersects [e1, e3] (This is the case considered in Proposition
??)
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [ e2, e3] and the indifference line
of voter 2 through x intersects [e1, e2]
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [e1, e2] and the indifference line
of voter 2 through x intersects [e1, e3]
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [ e1, e2] and the indifference line
of voter 2 through x intersects [ e1, e2]
This leads to a partition of the triangle X into four areas as indicated in Fig. 8 . 
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We can check that whenever x belongs to areas 2 ,  3 and 4, L2 (x) = X. From lemma 2,
this implies that the union of these areas is included in the uncovered set . Assume now 
that x belongs to the first area. Then, L( x) is the union of the quadrilateral xAe3 B and 
the two triangles xCD and xEF. This pattern is depicted in Fig. 9 where the hatched 
area corresponds to L(x) .20
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Figure 9 
L(X) and L2 (X)
From Lemma ??, to test if x E UC(u) , it is enough to calculate L2 (x) . From the 
geometry of the problem, it is straightforward to verify that L2 (x) is the union of the 
two triangles e3 FG and e3 DH where G is the intersection of [e2 , e3] with the indifference
line of voter 1 through F and H is the intersection of [e1 , e3] with the indifference line 
20Up to the exclusion of the boundaries. 
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of voter 2 through D. Let I = (w1 , w2 ) be the intersection of the lines GF and DH. 
Therefore, L2 (x) = X iff w1 + w2 < 1 . The rest of the proof amounts to simple calculus.
or 
The first coordinate of F ,  say Ji , is solution of the equation 
X2 fi = X1 + -.V2 
Therefore, the line FG is described by the equation 
Similarly, the second coordinate of D, say d2 , is solution of the linear equation 
or X1 d2 = - + x2 . V1 
Therefore, the line DH is described by the equation 
We deduce that 
which implies the conclusion. I 
Proof of Proposition ??:  
(1) Let b > � and x E X  with x4 < 1 .  Then, for at least two of the voters, say i and 
· < l-x4 d < l-x4 Th f · b 1 J ,  xi _ -2- an Xj _ -2-. ere ore, smce > 2 ,
1 - X4 . .  Uk · x = xk + bx4 � 2 + bx4 < b = uk · (O , O, O , l) for k E {i , J } . 
We deduce that (0, 0, 0, l)T(b)x and the conclusion follows. 
(2) Let � < b < � · It is clear that WC(b) = 0 as (� ,  � ' 0, O)T(b) (O, 0, 0, 1 ) .  Let us 
prove that UC(b) = {x E X : Xi = 0 for at least one i E {1 ,  2, 3}, Xk -/= M for any
k{l, 2, 3} } .  
(i) UC(b) C {x E X :  Xi = 0 for at least one i E {1 ,  2 ,  3} ,  Xk -/= M for any k{l ,  2 ,  3} } .
Let x E X with xi > 0 for all i E {1 ,  2 ,  3} .  Let y = (x1 - 8, x2 - 8, x3 - 8 ,  x4 + 38) 
where 0 < 8 < Min (x1 , x2 , x3) .  Since b > � '  y Pareto dominates and therefore covers x .
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Next, suppose that Xk = M for some k E {1 ,  2, 3} .  Then, x is covered by (0, 0 ,  0, M) , as 
x does not defeat any alternative. 
(ii) UC(b) :J {x E X : xi = 0 for at least one i E {1 ,  2, 3} and xk =/::. M for any 
k E {1 ,  2, 3} } .  Without loss of generality, consider the case where x3 = 0. Suppose that , 
contrary to the assertion, x is covered by y. Since we can take y to be uncovered, from 
(i) we deduce that either y = (y1 , y2 , 0, y4) or y = (y1 , 0, y3 , y4) or y = (0, Y2 , y3 , y4) .  Let
us consider the case where x4 =/::. 0. 
Subcase 1 : y4 :::; X4. Since yTx, we deduce that y4 =/::. X4 and therefore Y1 > x1 and Y2 >
X2 . It follows that (x1 , x2 , 0 ,  x4)T(y1 +Y2 , 0, 0 ,  y4) but not [(y1 , Y2 , 0 ,  y4)T(y1 + Y2 , 0, 0, y4)] .
This shows that y does not cover x .  
Subcase 2 : y4 > x4. The extra public good y4 - X4 is financed by voters 1 and
2. Without loss of generality, assume that voter 2 pays at least half of the cost i .e .
y2 - x2 :::; _ Y4;x4 • Consider the vector z
-
(1 - y2 - by4 - E:, y2 + by4 + E, 0 ,  0) where 
E: is a small positive number. Note that for E: small enough, z is a feasible allocation as 
y2 + by4 < y2 + �4 < 1 since b < � - Then, for E: small enough, xTz since x4 =/::. 0 while
however Not [yT z] . This shows again that y does not cover x. 
Case 2 :  y = (Y1 , 0 ,  y3 , y4) .
Subcase 1 : y4 :::; x4 . Then, for sufficiently small but positive, E, we have:
This shows that y does not cover x .  
Subcase 2 :  y4 > x4. Clearly, 3 prefers y to x .  Suppose first that 1 also prefers y to x
(and therefore that 2 prefers x to y) , and consider the vector z _ ( 1 - by4 - E:, by4 + E:, 0 ,  0) , 
where E: is a small positive number. Then, for small enough E, z is a feasible allocation 
and xTz while, not [yTz] . If instead 1 prefers x to y, and therefore 2 prefers y to x, 
consider the vector z = (y2 + by4 + E: ,  0 ,  1 - y2 - by4 - E:, 0) , where E: is a small positive 
number. Then, for small enough E ,  z is a feasible allocation and xTz since x4 =/::. 0, while 
not [yTz] . This again shows that y does not cover x. 
Case 3 :  y = (0 ,  y2 , y3 , y4) .  This case is similar to case 2 .
Consider the situation where x4 = 0 .  The analysis has to be changed slightly. 
Case 1 :  y = (y1 , y2 , 0, y4) .  Since yTx and b < � ' it must be that y4 > 0. Furthermore,
either y1 + by4 < x1 or y2 + by4 < x2 . Without loss of generality assume that the second 
inequality holds and let z - (0 ,  y2 + by4 + E:, 1 - y2 - by4 , 0) , where E: is a small positive 
number. Then, for small enough E, z is a feasible allocation and xTz while not [yTz] . 
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Case 2 :  y = (Y1 , 0 ,  y3 , y4) .  
Subcase 1 : y4 = 0 .  Since x1 =/= 0 and x2 =/= 0 ,  we deduce from Proposition ? ?  that y
cannot cover x. 
Subcase 2 : y4 > 0. Clearly, 3 prefers y to x. Suppose that 1 also prefers y to x (and 
therefore that 2 prefers x to y) , and consider the vector z (0, by4 + E, 1  - by4 - E, 0) ,  
where E is a small positive number. Then, for small enough E, z is a feasible allocation
and xTz while not [yTz] . If on the other hand, 1 prefers x to y ,  and therefore 2 prefers y
to x ,  consider the vector z _ (y1 + by4 +E, 0 ,  l - y1 - by4 - E, 0) where E is a small positive 
number .  Then, for small enough E, z is a feasible allocation and xTz since x2 =/= 0 while
not [yT z] . This shows again that y does not cover x. 
Case 3 :  y = (0, y2 , y3 , y4) .  Similar to case 2.
(3) Let b < �· Then
UC(b) = { x E X :  x4 = 0 and xk =/= M for any k E {1 ,  2 ,  3} }
The inclusion UC(b) c {x E X :  x4 = 0 }  follows from the fact that if b < � '  then any
x such that x4 > 0 is Pareto dominated and therefore covered. Since any alternative in 
UC(b I PO(b))21 where PO(b) denotes the set of Pareto undominated allocations is in
UC(b)22 , we deduce from Proposition ?? that UC(b) contains the set
{ x E X : x4 = 0 } . 
We now only need to prove that the vertices are not in UC(b) . This follows from the 
fact that for any vertex x, there is no y such that xTy. 
To complete the proof, it remains to be shown that if b < � ' then TC(b) = X.
From (3c) in Proposition ?? we know that any alternative in the set 
X
- { x = ( x1 , x2 , x3 , x4) E X : x4 = 0 } is connected to any other alternative in that 
set (the weak T-chain is in X) . To conclude it remains to prove that X and X\X are
connected. Let x E X with x4 > 0. Since b < � ' (x1 + �4 , x2 + �4 , x3 , O)Tx. Finally,
observe that xT(x1 + X4, x2 , X3 , 0) .  I 
21For any A �  X, UC(b I A) denotes the Uncovered Set when the set of alternatives is restricted to 
the subset A. 
22We leave the proof of this simple claim to the reader. Note however that the reverse inclusion 
UC � UC(PO) does not always hold i.e. , while the deletion of Pareto undominated alternatives can 
never hurts an alternative already in the Uncovered Set, the consideration of such alternatives may help 
some other alternatives which would not be in otherwise! 
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